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Boltzmann-Gibbs distribution arises as the statistical equilibrium probability distribu-
tion of money among the agents of a closed economic system where random and undi-
rected exchanges are allowed. When considering a model with uniform savings in the
exchanges, the final distribution is close to the gamma family. In this work, we imple-
ment these exchange rules on networks and we find that these stationary probability
distributions are robust and they are not affected by the topology of the underlying
network. We introduce a new family of interactions: random but directed ones. In this
case, it is found the topology to be determinant and the mean money per economic agent
is related to the degree of the node representing the agent in the network. The relation
between the mean money per economic agent and its degree is shown to be linear.
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Introduction
Agent-based modeling can be used to study systems exhibiting emergent prop-
erties which cannot be explained by aggregating the properties of the system’s
components.1 Statistical mechanics and economics share the property to analyze
big ensembles where the collective behaviour is found out as a result of interac-
tions at the microscopic level and where agent-based simulations can be applied.
Many systems are studied in terms of the nature that defines their inner compo-
nents while others are considered from the point of view of the interactions among
the agents that can be pictured through a complex network. Plenty of informa-
tion is encoded in connectivity patterns. Hierarchical structures appear in a natural
way when we study societies and, according to many authors,2 one of the mile-
stones is to understand why and how from individuals with initial identical status,
inequalities emerge. This is related to the question of hierarchy formation as a self-
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organization phenomenon due to social dynamics.3 Elitarian distributions can arise
starting from a society where people initially own an equal share of economic re-
sources, e.g.: the exponential distribution for the low and medium income classes
in western societies.4,5,6
We consider Dragulescu-Yakovenko gas-like models in economic exchanges7 so,
let our system be composed of N economic agents, being N  1 and constant. Each
agent i owns an amount of money mi so the state of the system at a given time is
defined by the values that every variable mi takes at that moment, {mi}Ni=1. Money
distribution among the agents should never be confused with the notion of wealth
distribution. Money is only one part inside the whole concept of wealth. Transfer of
money represents payment for goods and services in a market economy. We study
simplified models which keep track of that money flux but do not keep track of what
goods or services are delivered. At each interacting step, agents trade by pairs and
local conservation of money is sustained,
(mi, mj) 7−→ (m′i, m′j) : m′i = mi + ∆m, (1)
m′j = mj −∆m.
Transactions result in some part of the money involved in the interaction changing
its owner. For simplicity, we do not consider models where debts are allowed.
It is deeply established in the common knowledge that highly-ranked individuals
in societies have easier access to resources and better chances to compete. This is
a motivation to look for internal correlations between money and surrounding en-
vironment. We wonder if the exchange rules that define simple gas-like models for
random markets, when implemented on networks, are capable of depicting correla-
tions between purchasing power of an agent inside a social network and the influence
of the agent on the rest of the system. We associate the purchasing power concept
to the mean money per economic agent computed as a function of the connectivity
degree of each agent in a network. At this level, influence of an agent is only related
to the degree of the node representing the agent. We implement the exchange rules
on two type of networks: uniform random spatial graph and Baraba´si-Albert model,
and then examine the relationship between the former econo-social agent indicators
for the different underlying architectures.
In section 1, we review two well-known random undirected exchange rules: gen-
eral and uniform savings models. In section 2, we introduce a new family of inter-
actions: random but directed ones. The main property of this simple exchange rule
is that it is a real inspired model where social inequalities in money distribution
emerge in a natural way. In section 3, we show the relation between mean money
per economic agent and the connectivity degree of the agent. For the models with
undirected exchange rules, we observe no correlation between money and the degree
of the nodes. Linear dependence is found for the new random exchange model we
propose. Section 4 is devoted to gather the most relevant conclusions.
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1. Undirected random markets
1.1. Undirected random market
For some random economic systems where money is a conserved quantity, the
asymptotic distribution of money among the agents is given by the Boltzmann-
Gibbs distribution (BG),
peq(mi = m) =
1
〈m〉e
−m/〈m〉, (2)
where the role of the effective temperature is played by the average amount of money
per agent,
〈m〉 = 1
N
N∑
i=1
mi. (3)
This feature was first shown by Dragulescu and Yakovenko in 2000 by means of nu-
merical simulations.8 Subsequently, analytical justification was given by Lo´pez-Ruiz
et al. in 2008 and 2012. BG can be geometrically deduced9 under the assumption of
equiprobability of the possible economic microstates. We also know that an asymp-
totic evolution towards BG is obtained regardless of the initial distribution for those
systems with total money fixed and when considering random symmetric interac-
tions between pairs of components.10 This comes from BG being the stable fixed
point of the distributions’ space, L+1 [0,∞) = {p(x) :
∫∞
0
p(x) dx ≤ ∞}, under the
iterated action p(x)→ p′(x) of the integral operator T given by
p′(z) =
[T p](z) = ∫∫
S(z)
p(x) p(y)
x+ y
dx dy, (4)
where S(z) = {(x, y), x, y > 0, x+ y > z} is the integration domain.
Let us now consider the gas-like model originally proposed by Dragulescu and
Yakovenko so, at each computational step, we randomly choose a pair of agents and
then, one -the labeled as i- is chosen to be the winner in the interaction process
and the other one -labeled as j- becomes the loser and, according to the previously
stated rule (1), an amount of money ∆m is transferred from the loser to the winner.
Assuming ∆m ≥ 0, it is obvious that if the loser does not have enough money to
pay, which is nothing but the local condition mj < ∆m, the transaction is forbidden
and we should proceed with a different pair of agents.
Instead of considering the restriction in the interaction, we state the exchange
rule considering ∆m = ε(mi + mj) −mi that gives rise to the completely random
case given by
(mi, mj) 7−→ (m′i, m′j) : (5)
m′i = ε(mi +mj),
m′j = (1− ε)(mi +mj),
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Fig. 1. Undirected random market. Numerical simulation considering N = 5000 agents and
averaging over 250 samples. Every agent starts with mi = 〈m〉 = 0.5 and the exchange rule is given
by equation (5). Stationary probability distribution of money P (m), computed after N2 interac-
tions, compared to the blue solid curve describing the Boltzmann-Gibbs law P (m) ∝ e−m/〈m〉.
Log-linear plot and entropy time-evolution are the insets.
where ε ∈ [0, 1] is a uniform random number which is refreshed at every computa-
tional step. Observe that both agents can be winner or loser in a symmetric way,
depending on the random number ε at each step. This approach also ensures that no
agent will evolve to own a negative amount of money or, in other words, debts are
not allowed. The condition mi ≥ 0 for every agent i in the system is accomplished in
a natural way. This exchange rule (5) is a very rough macroeconomic model where
individuals or corporations raise their money for a venture and then, the market
effect or their mutual interaction determines the final distribution. See figure 1.
1.2. Undirected random market with uniform savings
The concept of savings arises in an obvious way from observing human behaviour
when people are inmerse in a market economy.11 This feature is introduced through
a parameter, λ ∈ [0, 1], which is called a propensity factor.12 This means that
each agent saves a fraction λ of its money when an interaction occurs and trades
randomly with the other part:
(mi, mj) 7−→ (m′i, m′j) : (6)
m′i = λmi + ε(1− λ)(mi +mj),
m′j = λmj + (1− ε)(1− λ)(mi +mj).
We consider the model with uniform savings which means that λ is fixed to be
constant among the agents and with no dependence on the time. The statistically
stationary distribution P (m) decays rapidly on both sides of the most probable
value for the money per agent which, in this case, is shifted from the poorest part of
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Fig. 2. Undirected random market with uniform savings. Numerical simulation considering
N = 5000 agents and averaging over 250 samples. Every agent starts with mi = 〈m〉 = 0.5 and
the exchange rule is given by equation (6). Stationary probability distribution of money P (m),
computed after N2 interactions for different values of λ. Entropy time-evolution insets.
the system to 〈m〉 when λ→ 1. See figure 2. This behaviour was already described
as a self-organising feature of the market induced by self-interest of saving by each
agent without any global perspective in an analogous way to the self-organisation
in markets with restricted comodities.13
First attempt to give a quantitative description for the steady distribution to-
wards this model evolves is due to Patriarca et al. in 2004. They stated that nu-
merical simulations of (6) could be fitted to a standard Gamma distribution.14
Subsequently (2007), Chatterjee and Chakrabarti offered a brief study of the con-
sequences that this modelization implies and stated that as λ increases, effectively
the agents retain more of its money in any trading, which can be taken as implying
that with increasing λ, temperature of the scattering process changes.15 According
to their study, fourth and higher order moments of the distributions are in discrep-
ancy with those of the Gamma family so, the actual form of the distribution for this
model still remains to be found out. Calbet et al. (2011) gave an iterative recipe to
derive an analytical expression solving an integral equation.16 A similar expression
was derived in a different way by Lallouache et al. (2010).17
2. New scenario: directed random market
We have shown how the propensity factor λ is introduced (6) as a variation for
the general random undirected exchange rule (5) showing how, from individual
responsible decissions -such as saving a fraction of your money when entering an
exchange market-, self-organized distributions where the mean and the mode are
close arise so, richness would be quite balanced distributed among the group. A
completely different scheme18 that modifies the general rule (1) proposes a random
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sharing of an amount 2mj (instead of mi + mj) only when mi > mj , trading at
the level of the lowest economic class in the trade. This model leads to an extreme
situation in which all the money in the market drifts to one agent and the rest
become truely pauper. From this idea, we give a new and more general exchange rule
reflecting this directed or biased orientation for the interaction and including this
particular result. We propose an integral operator which is the analytical approach
to this new rule in the mean-field or gas-like case and, in section 3, we implement
this rule on networks to study how it is affected when we mix directed interactions
with undirected networks.
The directed exchange can be understood as a first approach to microeconomic
activities where money is transferred only in one direction, similar to payments for
goods. We consider the most general family of interations,
(mi, mj) 7−→ (m′i, m′j) : (7)
m′i = εmi,
m′j = mj + (1− ε)mi.
where ε ∈ [0, 1] is a random number chosen with uniform probability. At each time,
the system is described by the probability distribution function of money when we
choose one of the agents randomly, P (m). In the continuous limit, we can picture
the system to be the combination of two identical copies, P1(u) and P2(v), of the
original system itself,
P (m) =
1
2
P1(m) +
1
2
P2(m). (8)
For each interaction we can consider that the two different agents i and j, with
money values being mi and mj , are two realizations of picking up randomly one
agent from each copy, P1(u = mi) and P2(v = mj) respectively. In every interaction
step (u, v)→ (u′, v′), there is a transaction of the agents conforming the distribution
P (m) to a new configuration given by
P ′(m) =
1
2
P ′1(m) +
1
2
P ′2(m), (9)
where the agents u′ will conform P ′1(m) and v
′ will conform P ′2(m). Let us now
consider the probability of a randomly chosen agent among the first copy P ′1(u
′)
owning an amount of money u′ = x after the interaction happened. From (7), it
is clear that u > x, and as the result u′ is uniformly distributed in [0, u] so, the
probability of obtaining a certain value x is given by 1/u. The interaction of pairs
(u, v) in the first configuration of the system gives rise to the evolution of P1(u) to
the following probability P ′1 of obtaining u
′ = x:
P ′1(x) =
∫∫
u>x
p(u) p(v)
u
du dv =
∫ ∞
0
p(v) dv ×
∫
u>x
p(u)
u
du =
∫
u>x
p(u)
u
du.
(10)
For the second copy, P ′2(v
′), we should consider that money of the second agent
after the interaction, v′ = x, should be a value between the initial money it has, v,
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and the maximum possible amount of money it can have after the interaction, which
will be associated to get all the money from the first agent so, v + u. Again, the
length of the segment [v, u+v] is u so, the probability of v′ is uniformly distributed
in that segment and so, the probability to have v′ = x will be 1/u. The expression
for the probability P ′2 of having v
′ = x in the second copy of the system results in
P ′2(x) =
∫∫
v<x<u+v
p(u) p(v)
u
du dv. (11)
We explicitly compute the norm,∫ ∞
0
P ′1(x) dx =
∫ ∞
0
dx
∫
u>x
p(u)
u
du =
∫ ∞
0
du
∫ u
0
p(u)
u
dx =
∫ ∞
0
p(u) du = 1, (12)∫ ∞
0
P ′2(x) dx =
∫ ∞
0
dx
∫
v<x<u+v
p(u) p(v)
u
du dv
=
∫ ∞
0
du
∫ ∞
0
dv
∫ u+v
v
p(u) p(v)
u
dx =
∫ ∞
0
p(u) du
∫ ∞
0
p(v) dv = 1,
and the expected value,∫ ∞
0
xP ′1(x) dx =
∫ ∞
0
x dx
∫∫
u>x
p(u)
u
du =
∫ ∞
0
du
∫ u
0
x
p(u)
u
dx (13)
=
1
2
∫
u p(u) du =
1
2
〈u〉.∫ ∞
0
xP ′2(x) dx =
∫ ∞
0
x dx
∫∫
v<x<u+v
p(u) p(v)
u
du dv
=
∫ ∞
0
du
∫ ∞
0
dv
∫ u+v
v
x
p(u) p(v)
u
du dv
=
∫ ∞
0
du
∫ ∞
0
1
2
u2 + 2uv
u
p(u) p(v) dv
=
1
2
[∫ ∞
0
du
∫ ∞
0
u p(u) p(v) dv +
∫ ∞
0
du
∫ ∞
0
2 v p(u) p(v) dv
]
=
3
2
〈u〉.
From results (12) and (13), together with definition (9), the norm and mean
value of the distributions are conserved when we define the operator for the directed
random interaction by[T p](x) = 1
2
∫
u>x
p(u)
u
du+
1
2
∫∫
v<x<u+v
p(u) p(v)
u
du dv. (14)
Although we cannot give a proof for the infinite iteration of this operator, we see
that it piles up the distribution at the lower values for m which gives rise to a very
impoverished population and a very slightest fraction of too opulent agents. Even
with such a very narrow initial distribution we choose, the effect of this operator is
very strong in only a couple of iterations. This result is in perfect agreement with
the first model of biased interaction18 we mentioned in our previous section. Other
models with asymetric rules that establish a transition between Boltzmann-Gibbs
and Pareto distributions can be found in the literature.19 See figure 3.
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Fig. 3. LEFT: First and second application of the integral operator (14) over a Gaussian distri-
bution. Dotted curve is the initial Gaussian distribution N(〈m〉 = 0.5, σ = 0.05). The distribution
resulting from the first application of (14),
[T p](x), is plotted in dashed lines. Second iteration,[T [T p]](x), is plotted in solid line. Due to the scale proportions, inset figure shows a detailed com-
parison between initial distribution and the resulting from the first iteration. RIGHT: Directed
random market implemented as gas-like model. Numerical simulation considering N = 5000 agents
and averaging over 250 samples. Every agent starts with mi = 〈m〉 = 0.5 and the exchange rule
is given by equation (7). Stationary probability distribution of money P (m), computed after N2
interactions and inset showing the whole entropy-evolution. We can appreciate how the system
starts evolving towards the state of maximum entropy and then it starts a self-organising process
which is very slow. When considering extremely long runs of the simulation we observe how the
entropy falls towards states of negligible entropy, as we should expect from a system where lack of
information in P (m) is just the permutation of the agent owning all the money.
3. Simulations on networks
We stated in the introduction of this work the desire of finding a first model which,
when implemented on networks, is able to show a relation between money and
influence of an agent on the system. For this purpose, we simulate the two models
we have already studied in section 1 and the new one we have presented in section
2. We choose two representative cases: the random uniform spatial network (SP)
and the Baraba´si-Albert model (BA). SP is an easy way to build networks with
Poissonian degree distributions20 and BA is an algorithm for generating random
scale-free networks following the preferential attachment prescription.21
At the beginning, every agent is given the same amount of money so, the initial
distribution of money among the agents is written
Pinitial(m) = δ(m− 〈m〉), (15)
and we obtain the steady state distribution for the exchange rules (5), (6) and (7)
implemented on these two different topologies. From the histogram related to the
distribution of money among the agents, we can consider the entropy associated to
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that distribution in a discrete form,
S = −
Imax∑
i=1
P∆(i) logP∆(i), (16)
where ∆ just recalls the coarse graining when computig P (m) as a discrete his-
togram. For simplicity, we measure S/Smax, the entropy as a fraction of the maxi-
mum which is given for the exponential distribution.
If the money distribution is affected by the topology of the underlying network, it
should show some kind of dependence on the degree of the agents. For our purposes
it is enough for the reader to associate the degree of a node to its number of
neighbouring agents it can interact with. As we will only use for now undirected
and static networks, the degree of an agent will be a distinctive feature. We define
the mean money per economic agent as a function of k, 〈m〉(k), given by
〈m〉(k) = 1
N2Nk
N2∑
τ=1
Nk∑
i=1
mi(τ) ∀ i : ki = k. (17)
Note that we compute the mean money of the nodes inside each class of connectivity
at every step of our simulation and then, we consider the time-averaged mean money
per node according to the different degrees. Nk denotes how many nodes have degree
k and our simulations run for N2 steps. There is no need to be worried about the
transitory regime disturbing the computed results for 〈m〉(k) because it is negligible:
less than 0.5% of total computed steps in the worst case (see figure 6). We also
compute the standard deviation, σm(k), given by
σm(k) =
√√√√ 1
N2Nk
N2∑
τ=1
Nk∑
i=1
[
mi(τ)− 〈m〉(k)
]2
(18)
∀ i : ki = k.
In figures 4, 5 and 6 we show, for the rules (5), (6) and (7), respectively, the
stationary probability distribution P (m) with entropy-evolution of S/Smax for the
whole simulation with inset detail of the transitory regime when it is required. When
we plot the distributions 〈m〉(k) and σm(k), it is also shown the characteristic degree
distribution of the networks we implement.
We clearly see in these figures how rules (5) and (6) are transparent to the
underlying topology, provoking always the decay of the economic system to the BG
or Gamma-like distributions, respectively, indistinctly of the different connectivities
of the agents. We can say that for these types of interactions the economic classes
are blind respect to the social influence of the agents. By contrary, the new directed
rule (7) separates the agents in economic classes correlated with their connectivities,
in such a way that more connected agents show a bigger propensity to accumulate
more money, in this case with a linear relationship between money and connectivity.
This is a characteristic that, in general and independently of the political system
installed in the power, seems to be more likely to be found in the reality.
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(b) Baraba´si-Albert model:
0 2 4 6 8
0.00
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.10
m
PH
m
L
0 2500 5000
0
0.5
1
Time Steps  N
S
S
m
ax
0 1 2 3 4 5
0
0.5
1
10 50 100 500
0.5
k
Xm
\Hk
L
10 50 100 500
0.5
k
Σ
m
Hk
L
LogScale
Lo
gS
ca
le
k
PH
kL
Fig. 4. Undirected random market implemented on networks. Numerical simulation considering
N = 5000 agents and averaging over 250 networks for each type (a) and (b). Every agent starts
with mi = 〈m〉 = 0.5 and the exchange rule is given by equation (5). LEFT: Stationary prob-
ability distribution of money P (m), computed after N2 interactions, compared to the blue solid
curve describing the Boltzmann-Gibbs law P (m) ∝ e−m/〈m〉 and entropy-evolution for the whole
time of the simulation and inserted detail for the initial transitory. RIGHT: Mean money per eco-
nomic agent computed according to (17) and its standard deviation, given by (18). Typical degree
distribution is also shown.
Directed Random Markets: Connectivity determines Money 11
(a) Spatial network:
Λ=0.8
Λ=0.5
Λ=0.3
Λ=0.05
0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
m
PH
m
L
0 2500 5000
0
0.5
1
Time Steps  N
S
S
m
ax
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
0.50
0.55
0.60
0.65
0.70
k
Xm
\Hk
L
0 35 70
0.2
0.5
k
Σ
m
Hk
L
0 35 70
0
0.03
0.06
k
PH
kL
(b) Baraba´si-Albert model:
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Fig. 5. Undirected random market with uniform savings implemented on networks. Numerical
simulation considering N = 5000 agents and averaging over 250 networks for each type (a) and (b).
Every agent starts with mi = 〈m〉 = 0.5 and the exchange rule is given by equation (6). LEFT:
Stationary probability distribution of money P (m), computed after N2 interactions for different
values of λ and entropy-evolution for the whole time of the simulation. Transitory towards equilib-
rium entropy is analogous to the one shown in figure 4. RIGHT: Mean money per economic agent
computed according to (17) and its standard deviation, given by (18). Typical degree distribution
is also shown.
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(b) Baraba´si-Albert model:
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Fig. 6. Directed random market implemented on networks. Numerical simulation considering
N = 5000 agents and averaging over 250 networks for each type (a) and (b). Every agent starts
with mi = 〈m〉 = 0.5 and the exchange rule is given by equation (7). LEFT: Stationary probability
distribution of money P (m), computed after N2 interactions and entropy-evolution for the whole
time of the simulation with inset showing transitory regime at the beginning. We can appreciate
how the system evolves towards a highly entropic state and then it start a self-organising process
which is analogous to what we found for the gas-like approach in figure 3 but, now, it reaches a
stable regime. The steady state is characteristic for each network. This comes from the different
values at which S/Smax stabilizes. RIGHT: Mean money per economic agent computed according
to (17) and its standard deviation, given by (18). Linear fit is obvious. Typical degree distribution
is also shown.
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4. Conclusion
We have found that topology does not determine the final equilibrium distribution
for the family of undirected random markets, both with or without uniform savings,
as can be seen by comparing the distributions P (m) from figures 4 and 5 to those
from figures 1 and 2. Thus, from the uniform value of 〈m〉(k) and σm(k), we can
conclude that the connectivity of an agent immersed in undirected random markets
does not determine if the agent will have more or less money, that is, the degree k
of an agent does not decide its richness.
When we consider the directed random market given by the operator (14), sim-
ulations plotted in the figure 6 suggest that this model reproduces very clearly the
real insight based on the impression that in certain societies the richness is owned by
a very small fraction of the population and poverty is extended among the majority
of the agents. For this type of economies, we also discover that the underlying topol-
ogy determines the stationary distribution of money among the agents, P (m), and
that the connectivity of each agent proportionally determines its average richness.
Assuming that we can apply this rule for any quantity that can be exchanged,
and not only money, this result introduces the interesting idea of how we can create
systems with a property shared by its inner components with an steady distribu-
tion essentially determined by the topology defined by the connections between the
agents, although evidently this statistical equilibrium is dynamical and presents a
continuous flow between those agents. It is also interesting to highlight how this
system evolves from the initial zero-entropy state to a state with maximum entropy
and then how it relaxes towards the asymptotic equilibrium state.
Let us conclude by saying that we have introduced a new directed random market
model in the context of economic gas-like models, which can be understood as a
first and simple model characterized by more connectivity implies more money.
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